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There are two reasons why I may not be the best person to criticize this paper. First, because 
I have a very limited knowledge of the AI literature. 
Second, because the basic approach to argument which is the core of this paper -- i.e. the 
suggestion that we should attempt to understand natural language argumentation in terms of 
argumentation schemes that define particular kinds of reasoning -- is an approach to reasoning to 
which I am myself committed. Indeed, it is an approach that I have, often in work with Chris 
Tindale, advocated for fifteen years (see Groarke and Tindale 1986; Groarke and Tindale 1989 
and 1997; and Groarke 1999). 
Given my own commitment to the general approach to reasoning defended in this paper, and 
my relative lack of knowledge of the literature on AI, I will have to focus my remarks in this 
commentary on the particular approach to argumentation schemes which Reed and Walton 
suggest. To this extent I shall try to further our discussion here by offering two brief criticisms of 
their approach, and by ending with a concluding remark. 
Questions or Answers 
The conception of argumentation scheme which Reed and Walton offer describes an 
argumentation scheme as a “pattern of reasoning,” a “form of argument,” or a “structure of 
inference.” So far so good. According to the account they develop, an argumentation scheme is 
paired with a set of “critical questions” which is used to assess any instance of a scheme. While I 
think it is possible to understand argumentation schemes in this way, I want to begin by noting 
that we do not need to place such a conceptual emphasis on the role of critical questions in 
understanding argumentation schemes. 
Imagine an argumentation scheme, let’s call it A, which is accompanied by a set of critical 
questions, Q1...Qn. We have a good instance of argumentation scheme A if and only if we can in 
this instance answer questions Q1...Qn in an appropriate way. Let’s call the appropriate answers 
A1...An. Looked at from this point of view, we can describe an argumentation scheme as a 
pattern of reasoning which depends on a set of propositions A1...An. These propositions may be 
presented as explicit premises in the argument but they may – like many of the assumptions that 
argumentation depends on – be left implicit. 
Looked at from this point of view, we can identify an argumentation scheme as a pattern of 
reasoning which fits a pattern of reasoning which is to be identified by identifying, not the 
critical questions which should be asked about it, but the kinds of premises it must implicitly or 
explicitly depend on. Of course, the critical questions that Reed and Walton associate with 
argumentation schemes arise in due course, for they arise as soon as we ask whether the premises 
the inference depends upon are true or probable or plausible. That said, there is no need to 
formalize argumentation schemes by the indirect route of identifying these questions when we 
can identify the premises they require directly. By identifying the premises directly we can place 
argumentation schemes into a well understood framework of arguments, premises and 
conclusions. 
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Deductive or Non-Deductive? 
Once we understand argumentation schemes in the way I have proposed we can better 
understand some issues raised by the motivation that Reed and Walton give for their own 
conception of argumentation schemes. They propose argumentation schemes as a way to 
incorporate non-deductive and non-monotonic forms of reasoning. In the present context, I will 
leave the issue of monotonicity aside. Suffice it to say, ordinary reasoning is non-monotonic and 
any account of it must somehow account for this. This does show that something beyond 
classical logic will have to be used in attempts to formalize natural language reasoning. I believe 
that issues of tonicity highlight requirements that show that good inferences in natural language 
require, not only premises that imply the proposed conclusion, but also a set of premises which 
meets some standard of consistency and coherence. But this is a matter I leave for elsewhere. 
In the present context, I will only address the question of deductivism. Here there are 
misconceptions buried in the present paper, which associates deductive reasoning with certainty. 
This is a common confusion but it is a confusion. The validity of a deductive inference does not 
ensure the certainty of the conclusion, but only that it is as certain as the premises. Thus the 
argument:  
“This is an argumentation paper completed this month. All argumentation papers 
completed this month are outstanding papers. This is an outstanding paper.” 
is a deductive argument which is valid. But we would doubt the conclusion, because we are 
likely to doubt the premises, and particularly the second. 
It is in this context worth noting that it is a mistake to think that deductive reasoning is 
indelibly associated with the kind of reasoning that characterizes classical logic and 
mathematics. Such reasoning is equally as important in moral contexts (in the case of two 
wrongs reasoning, for example, which is discussed as a scheme in Groarke 1999), which are just 
the sorts of contexts in which argumentation theory needs to develop and exercise its ability to 
understand natural language reasoning. 
It is easy to see how all argumentation schemes can be understood as deductive as soon as 
we move beyond the assumption that deductive inference is tied to certainty. For any 
argumentation A, which depends on propositions A1...An (which are answers to critical 
questions Q1...Qn), can be understood as the inference: 
A1,... An 
If A1 &....An, then C 
Therefore C 
where the C is the appropriate conclusion. It is wrong to think that this manner of 
understanding argumentation schemes undermines the subtleties of probative argument which 
Reed and Walton claim to capture by argumentation schemes. For these subtleties are 
automatically incorporated in the description of the scheme, for they are reflected in the nature of 
the premises (A1,...An) required for the conclusion. 
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A Concluding Comment 
None of this is meant to deny the basic point made in this paper – that an approach to 
argument which focuses on argumentation schemes can be a powerful tool which will help us 
better understand and assess natural language reasoning both in pedagogical and AI contexts. To 
this extent argumentation theory should devote itself to the attempt to identify, define and 
formalize argumentation schemes and a theoretical framework in which they can be understood. 
In my own opinion, it will be particularly important to develop two facets of a theory of 
argumentation schemes. The first is some clearer method of identifying argumentation schemes 
in natural language discourse -- especially as arguments are in these contexts often expressed in 
ways which are vague, ambiguous and capable of being understood in terms of different 
argumentation schemes. 
The second is some taxonomy of argumentation schemes which allows us to better 
understand how different argumentation schemes are related to one another, and which do or 
should take precedence in particular argumentation contexts. There is a great deal of work to be 
done, but papers like the present one may push us in the right direction. 
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